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I. INTRODUCTION

Not only are technological innovations proliferating by the day, current technology is also expanding in both capability and use. One technology in particular
is being used in numerous new ways by a variety of groups: facial-recognition
technology (FRT).1 Private companies are utilizing FRT in a number of ways
that enhance the personalized nature of their products, but foreign governments
have also been testing out uses of the technology.2 One of the ways governments
have used FRT is to assist police in criminal identification.3 However, many critics warn that police use of FRT violates privacy rights and Congress should introduce legislation to protect these rights.4 Some localities have gone as far as
enacting laws prohibiting local government from using FRT on citizens.5 In the
2019 case of Bridges v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police, a Welsh citizen sued
the South Wales Police Department alleging a violation by the police department
of his privacy rights under several laws, including the European Convention on
Human Rights.6 The Court said “the case was the first of its kind worldwide.”7
This Note is divided into two major sections. The first section provides information on how FRT generally works, how FRT is being used differently by private and public organizations, and how various countries and localities are either
using FRT or reacting to the possible use of FRT. The second section explores
the Bridges case in more detail, discussing the Plaintiff’s claims, analyzing the
lower and appellate Welsh court’s reasoning, what the appellate court found, and
assessing how the case would likely play out if appealed to the European Court
of Human Rights. If appealed, the European Court of Human Rights will most
likely affirm the initial Bridges ruling that Facial Recognition Surveillance does
not violate Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Lastly, this
1
Steve Symanovich, How Does Facial Recognition Work?, NORTON SECURITY (Feb. 8,
2019), https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-iot-how-facial-recognition-software-works.
html.
2
Ryan Browne, Tech Giants Want Rules on Facial Recognition, but Critics Warn that
Won’t be Enough, CNBC (Aug. 30, 2019, 1:26 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/30/facial-recognition-tech-firms-want-regulation-but-critics-want-a-ban.html.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Shirin Ghaffary, San Francisco’s Facial Recognition Technology Ban, Explained, VOX
(May 14, 2019, 7:06 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/14/18623897/san-franciscofacial-recognition-ban-explained.
6
British Activist to Appeal ‘Sinister’ Police Facial Recognition, REUTERS (Sept. 4, 2019,
12:42 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-tech-privacy/british-activist-to-appealsinister-police-facial-recognition-idUSKCN1VP2CI.
7
Id.
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Note considers whether and how the Bridges decisions shape current international privacy norms.

II. BACKGROUND

FRT is being used by private and public entities increasingly each day. One of
the most highly advertised features of the iPhone is its “Face ID” capability,
which is an example of FRT being utilized by private entities.8 It is important to
understand how facial recognition works. Put simply, the technology is “[a] facial recognition system [that] uses biometrics to map facial features from a photograph or video. It compares the information with a database of known faces to
find a match.”9 While various FRT systems may operate differently, there are
some basic steps. First, a photo or video registers a face and captures the face.10
Next, the system will “read[] the geometry of” the face, including factors like
“the distance between your eyes and the distance from forehead to chin.11 The
software identifies facial landmarks—one system identifies 68 of them—that are
key to distinguishing your face.”12 The result is known as the facial signature.13
Third, the resulting facial signature “is compared to a database of known
faces.”14 Lastly, a determination is made on whether the facial signature matches
a face within the database.15 After providing a basic understanding of how the
technology works, this Note now focuses on how personal facial biometric data
can be used.
Many people are aware of the use of FRT by mobile devices, but how else is
this technology being used? Both private and government entities are using FRT
in more ways than one could imagine. For example, the Ontario Lottery and
Gaming Corporation uses FRT on some of its slot machines to identify problem
gamblers.16 Additionally, some hotels use FRT so that concierges can greet customers by name, there are dating apps that proclaim to match individuals with
similar facial features, and some colleges use FRT to take attendance in class.17
8
About Face ID Advanced Technology, APPLE INC. (Feb. 26, 2020), https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208108.
9
Symanovich, supra note 1.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Ysolt Usigan, 7 Surprising Ways Facial Recognition is Used, CBS NEWS (Aug. 5, 2011,
1:56 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/7-surprising-ways-facial-recognition-is-used
/2/.
17
Id.
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Law enforcement also uses FRT to catch known identity thieves when they are
applying for driver’s licenses.18 A more well-known use of FRT is on Facebook.
When users upload pictures, Facebook scans faces in each picture and suggests
“tagging” the people it believes those faces belong to.19 According to Facebook,
the software accurately identifies a face ninety-eight percent of the time.20 As
FRT usage across all industries becomes more prevalent, the market for this technology is simultaneously growing, expecting to jump from a $4 billion industry
in 2017 up to $7.7 billion in 2022.21
Like private entities, government entities are also utilizing FRT. In 2016,
Georgetown Law conducted a study finding that “more than half of American
adults were enrolled in a face recognition network searchable by law enforcement.”22 Some organizations based in the United States are wary of FRT and fear
that its use may infringe on constitutional rights because the technology “can be
used in a passive way that doesn’t require the knowledge, consent, or participation of the subject.”23 One of the major concerns about FRT in the United States
is that photographs of citizens from state motor vehicle agencies could be used
in conjunction with public video surveillance to create a system that identifies
and tracks citizens.24
In fact, the United States Government Accountability Office reported that,
“[s]ince 2011, the FBI had logged more than 390,000 facial-recognition searches
of federal and local databases, including state [Department of Motor Vehicles
(DMV)] databases . . . .”25 Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents have
also utilized DMV records for facial recognition purposes in states that allow
undocumented immigrants to obtain driver’s licenses or permits.26 The FBI has
responded to criticism of FRT usage, stating, “while facial-recognition searches
can provide helpful leads, agents are expected to verify the findings and secure

18

Id.
Symanovich, supra note 1.
20
Naomi Lachange, Facebook’s Facial Recognition Software is Different from the FBI’s.
Here’s Why, NPR (May 18, 2016, 9:30 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/05/18/477819617/facebooks-facial-recognition-software-is-different-from-thefbis-heres-why.
21
Symanovich, supra note 1.
22
The Perpetual Line-Up: Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America, GEO. L.
CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH., https://www.law.georgetown.edu/privacy-technology-center/publications/the-perpetual-line-up/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2021).
23
Face Recognition Technology, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/face-recognition-technology (last visited Mar. 29, 2021).
24
Id.
25
Drew Harwell, FBI, ICE Find State Driver’s License Photos are a Gold Mine for Facial-Recognition Searches, WASH. POST (July 7, 2019, 3:54 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/07/fbi-ice-find-state-drivers-license-photos-are-gold-minefacial-recognition-searches/.
26
Id.
19
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definitive proof before pursuing arrests or criminal charges.”27 Twenty-one states
and the District of Columbia allow federal agencies to scan driver’s license photos, and the FBI has access to more than 641 million photos for facial-recognition
searches.28 While concerns about FRT inaccurately identifying individuals leading to false arrests are significant, this Note focuses on a critical issue of FRT
use: the right to privacy.29
FRT is being utilized by various parties across the world, and public reaction
to the technology differs. San Francisco was the first major city in the United
States to ban local government from using the technology after catching wind of
its critiques and possible violation of privacy.30 Other American cities, such as
Oakland, California, and Somerville, Massachusetts, also proposed or passed
legislation banning government use of FRT.31
Germany’s Ministry of the Interior began a pilot program in 2017 using FRT
in the Berlin Südkreuz railway station.32 In order to gain participants for the program, “the ministry recruited around 300 volunteers who agreed, in exchange for
a €25 Amazon voucher, to have their names and two biometric photos stored in
a database and to carry a transponder around with them.”33 Requiring participants
to carry a transponder allowed the authorities to track when participants travelled
through the station.34 The second phase of the program tested whether cameras
could identify suspicious behavior in real-time.35 However, many Germans were
unpleased with these new security measures in place; critics of the pilot program
worry the technology “is insufficiently transparent and exposes citizens to invasions of privacy, especially if their data is kept on file.”36 Germans, after experiencing “two surveillance states” during the Nazi and East German communist
regimes, are especially wary about invasions of personal privacy.37
China is using FRT in a multitude of ways, from law enforcement to social
uses. Cameras on lamp posts, outside buildings, and on streets are able to

27

Id.
Id.
29
Catie Edmondson, ICE Used Facial Recognition to Mine State Driver’s License Databases, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/us/politics/ice-drivers-licenses-facial-recognition.html.
30
Ghaffary, supra note 5.
31
Id.
32
Janosch Delcker, Big Brother in Berlin, POLITICO (Sept. 13, 2018, 10:57 AM),
https://www.politico.eu/article/berlin-big-brother-state-surveillance-facial-recognition-technology/.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
28
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recognize Chinese citizens.38 Moreover, some public housing projects use FRT
to prevent illegal subletting, allowing only residents and delivery persons to enter.39 Chinese law enforcement “use[s] facial recognition to pluck persons of interest from concert crowds, and have even used wearable Google Glass-style devices that allow a cop to scan the face of anyone they’re looking at.”40 Chinese
citizens found a way to possibly avoid FRT usage.41 As noted in media coverage,
“[m]any protesters now cover their faces, and they fear that the police are using
cameras and possibly other tools to single out targets for arrest.”42
In Wales, the South Wales Police began a pilot program using FRT, allowing
officers to monitor the movement of people in specific locations.43 The Police
explained that camera positions would be used to identify people who were on a
pre-determined watch list. The makeup of each watch list could include wanted
persons or persons suspected of criminality, missing persons, and persons of interest.44 The Police also said FRT could be used for both public safety and national security purposes, including for uses such as identifying individuals during
a disturbance, or maintaining the security of high-traffic places.45
The South Wales Police call the program “AFR Locate,” for automated facial
recognition technology.46 It can be used in “live-time” and compares live images
from cameras placed around the city against a predetermined watchlist of persons
of interest.47 The program was used around fifty times between May 2017 and
April 2019.48 The South Wales Police created a website that provides the basis
of the technology, upcoming events where they are utilizing the program, past
events where they used the program, and frequently asked questions and
38

Arjun Kharpal, China’s Surveillance Tech is Spreading Globally, Raising Concerns
About
Beijing’s
Influence,
CNBC
(Oct.
8,
2019,
1:18
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/08/china-is-exporting-surveillance-tech-like-facial-recogniti
on-globally.html.
39
Tom Simonite, Behind the Rise of China’s Facial-Recognition Giants, WIRED (Sept.
03, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/behind-rise-chinas-facial-recognition-giants/.
40
Id.
41
Paul Mozur, In Hong Kong Protests, Faces Become Weapons, N.Y. TIMES (July 26,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/technology/hong-kong-protests-facial-recognition-surveillance.html.
42
Id.
43
Introduction of Facial Recognition into South Wales Police, S. WALES POLICE,
https://afr.south-wales.police.uk/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2021).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
R. (on the application of Bridges) v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police [2019] EWHC
(QB) 2341, 2019 WL 04179616 (Eng.), https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4A7E5AE0CF
3211E99573C5E0B6E03B9F/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc
.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0.
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answers.49 The website reassures citizens “[f]aces that are not matched against
the watchlist are not remembered or kept,” and “[p]eople not featured in a watchlist can’t be identified.”50
While the South Wales Police support the use of FRT, not all Welsh citizens
feel similarly.51 In 2019, Ed Bridges brought the first major legal challenge
against the use of FRT by the South Wales Police.52 Bridges believes his face
was scanned by the Wales Police twice—once during busy holiday shopping and
once during a peaceful protest.53 Bridges stated that the van equipped with FRT
“was parked directly opposite” of a “peaceful demonstration—seemingly aimed
at discouraging us from lawfully exercising our right to protest.”54 At the core of
Bridges’ argument is his belief that the use of FRT by the police violates citizens’
privacy. Bridges is also concerned about FRT’s behavioral effect on privacy,
such as people feeling scared to protest.55 Along with his privacy infringement
claim, Bridges argues the technology the police are using is highly flawed, with
ninety-one percent of their ‘matches’ being misidentifications, totaling 2,451
people wrongly identified.56 Based on these concerns, Bridges sued the Chief
Constable of South Wales Police in Bridges v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police, claiming a violation of his privacy rights under the Welsh Equality Act of
2010, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Data Protection Acts
of 1998 and 2018.57 On September 4, 2019, the High Court in Wales dismissed
the case.58 Afterwards, Bridges publicly stated that he would appeal the decision.59 The case was appealed to the Court of Appeal and it ruled in Bridges’s
favor on August 11, 2020, finding that the use FRT by the police violated Article
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.60 The remainder of this Note
49

Introduction of Facial Recognition into South Wales Police, supra note 43.
Id.
51
Police Facial Recognition Technology Rules ‘Need Tightening,’ BBC NEWS (May 23,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-48383920.
52
Id.
53
Ed Bridges, End Lawless and Dangerous Police use of Facial Recognition Technology,
CROWDJUSTICE, https://www.crowdjustice.com/case/facial-recognition/ (last visited Mar. 31,
2021).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
R. (on the application of Bridges) v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police [2019] EWHC
(QB) 2341, 2019 WL 04179616 at *5 (Eng.), https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4A7
E5AE0CF3211E99573C5E0B6E03B9F/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&conte
xtData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0.
58
Id.
59
British Activist to Appeal ‘Sinister’ Police Facial Recognition, supra note 6.
60
Lara White & Janine Regan, Key Takeaways for the Private Sector from The Bridges v
South Wales Police Facial Recognition Case, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Aug. 27, 2020),
https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2020/08/key-takeaways-for-the-private-sector-fromthe-bridges-v-south-wales-police-facial-recognition-case/.
50
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discusses the Courts’ reasoning in Bridges, and whether, if appealed all the way
to the European Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights
would find a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights, and lastly,
how those decisions might shape international privacy norms.

III. ANALYSIS

Wales is a part of the United Kingdom, and the United Kingdom is a member
of the Council of Europe.61 The forty-seven states that are members of the Council of Europe are all parties to the European Convention on Human Rights.62 The
idea for the European Convention on Human Rights arose during the Second
World War in the 1940s.63 The convention was adopted in 1950 and entered into
force in 1953.64 Agreement to the convention is a prerequisite for joining the
Council of Europe.65 If an individual feels that their rights under the convention
have been violated, they may bring a complaint to the Strasbourg Court when
they have exhausted all their appeal opportunities in their member state’s
courts.66
There are fifty-nine Articles in the heart of the European Convention on Human Rights.67 Bridges claimed his rights were violated under Article 8 of the
Convention.68 Article 8, the “[r]ight to respect for private and family life,” states
the following:
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence.

61
Our Member States, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/ourmember-states (last visited Mar. 31, 2021).
62
What is the European Convention on Human Rights?, AMNESTY INT’L UK (Aug. 21,
2018, 4:47 PM), https://www.amnesty.org.uk/what-is-the-european-convention-on-humanrights.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
The European Convention on Human Rights: A Convention to Protect your Rights and
Liberties, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, https://www.coe.int/en/web/human-rights-convention/home
(last visited Mar. 31, 2021).
66
Id.
67
European Convention on Human Rights, COUNCIL EUR., https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2021).
68
R. (on the application of Bridges) v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police [2019] EWHC
(QB) 2341, 2019 WL 04179616 at *10 (Eng.), https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4A7
E5AE0CF3211E99573C5E0B6E03B9F/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&conte
xtData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0.
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There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.69
Moreover, Bridges brought claims under the Data Protection Acts (DPA) of
1998 and 2018 and the Public-Sector Equality Duty Claim; however, this Note
does not discuss Bridges’ claims under these laws in detail because they do not
have the same international significance as the convention. The Bridges case has
been heard by a lower-level court, the High Court of Wales, and an appellate
court, the Court of Appeal. Both decisions will be briefly discussed here.
In the first decision of the Bridges case, the High Court of Wales looked at
Bridges’ claim that the South Wales Police’s use of AFR Locate violated Article
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.70 The court acknowledged that
the use of FRT was “technology of the sort that must give pause for thought
because of its potential to impact upon privacy rights.”71 The court further recognized the warranted concern of FRT usage, quoting “the Grand Chamber of
the Strasbourg Court” in S v. United Kingdom:
[T]he protection afforded by art.8 of the Convention would be
unacceptably weakened if the use of modern scientific techniques
in the criminal-justice system were allowed at any cost and without carefully balancing the potential benefits of the extensive use
of such techniques against important private-life interests . . . any
state claiming a pioneer role in the development of new technologies bears special responsibility for striking the right balance in
this regard.72
In determining whether the police violated Article 8 of the Convention, the
court first looked at the “reach” of Article 8.73 The opinion acknowledged that
while Article 8 has its limits, it is still a broad law.74 The words “private life”
69

European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 67.
R. (on the application of Bridges) v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police [2019] EWHC
(QB) 2341, 2019 WL 04179616 at *10 (Eng.), https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4
A7E5AE0CF3211E99573C5E0B6E03B9F/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&co
ntextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0.
71
Id.
72
Id. (quoting S v. United Kingdom, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 32).
73
Id.
74
Id.
70
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comprise many spheres of life and can “embrace multiple aspects of a person’s
‘physical and social identity,’ including . . . gender, name, other means of personal identification and of linking to a family, ethnic identity, and elements relating to a person’s right to their image.”75
To find for Bridges, the court would have had to conclude his rights were
violated under Article 8, and then determine the use of FRT by the police was
not in accordance with the law or unnecessary for the listed reasons in Article
8(2).76 In determining whether the technology infringed upon Bridges’ privacy,
the court noted that in another case “where state actions complained of were ‘expected and unsurprising,’ it might well be that such actions might entail no
breach of Article 8(1)” and stated that merely taking pictures of citizens in public
spaces, without aggravating circumstances, was not an infringement of Article 8
rights.77 However, the court deemed that AFR Locate could not be characterized
the same way as merely taking a photograph could be.78 The court reasoned the
two instances were much different because in AFR Locate, “[t]he digital information that comprises the image is analysed and the biometric facial data is extracted. That information is then further processed when it is compared to the
watchlists information. The fact that this happens when the Claimant is in a public space is not a sufficient response.”79 Further, the court noted that “[t]he extraction and use of the Claimant’s biometric data takes the present case well beyond the ‘expected and unsurprising.’”80 Once again, the decision quoted the
European Court of Human Rights, which previously stated, “[t]he mere storing
of data relating to private life of an individual amounts to an interference within
the meaning of art.8.’”81 Much like fingerprints or DNA, AFR Locate provides
“the extraction of unique information and identifiers” which can lead to identification of an individual.82 The court determined the time period of the retention
of the facial data did not matter; rather, that the collection of data is sufficient
under Article 8 if the data is captured, stored, and processed.83 For reasons
75

Id. (citation omitted).
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 67.
77
R. (on the application of Bridges) v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police [2019] EWHC
(QB) 2341, 2019 WL 04179616 at *12 (Eng.) (quoting R . (On the Application of Wood) v.
Commissioner
of
Police
of
the
Metropolis
[2010]
1
WLR
123),
https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4A7E5AE0CF3211E99573C5E0B6E03B9F/View/Ful
lText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0.
78
Id. at *17.
79
Id. at *12.
80
Id. at *13.
81
Id.
82
Id. at *18.
83
R. (on the application of Bridges) v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police [2019] EWHC
(QB) 2341, 2019 WL 04179616 at *14 (Eng.), https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4A7
E5AE0CF3211E99573C5E0B6E03B9F/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&conte
xtData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0.
76
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discussed above, as well as a few other minor factors discussed by the court, the
court ruled that the use of AFR Locate did infringe upon Bridges’ rights under
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.84
The next question in resolving Bridges’ claims under Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights was the more complex piece of the analysis:
Whether the South Wales Police’s use of AFR Locate was in accordance with
the law.85 Bridges presented several contentions that the Police’s use of FRT was
not in accordance with the law.86 For example, Bridges pointed to legislation that
regulated the Police’s collection and use of fingerprints and DNA, and noted that
there was no similar, or adequate, legal framework for facial recognition technology at the time.87 Considering that understanding of the police’s common law
powers, and looking at some applications of that power, the court found that the
police did not need express statutory powers in order to use AFR Locate.88
Bridges’s second contention was that there was no sufficient legal framework
for AFR Locate.89 The court noted that a previous decision found that the necessary qualities of a legal framework were foreseeability, predictability, and legality.90 In Wales, there are different legal frameworks for obtaining other types of
biometric data such as fingerprints and DNA.91 The court acknowledged that different types of biometric information should be evaluated individually when determining the appropriate legal framework for each.92
The court found there was a “clear and sufficient legal framework” to determine when and how AFR Locate could be used by the police.93 It reasoned that
just because the technology was new, the technology was not “outside the scope
of existing regulation, or that it is always necessary to create a bespoke legal
framework for it.”94 The court asserted that the use of FRT was already regulated
in three ways: primary legislation, secondary legislative instruments, like codes,
and the local police’s own policies.95 In light of these regulations and common

84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id. at *14.
Id. at *15.
Id. at *15–16.
Id. at *20–21.
Id. at *18.
Id.
Id. (citing R (Gillan) v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006] 2 AC 307 at

[34]).
91

R. (on the application of Bridges) v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police [2019] EWHC
(QB) 2341, 2019 WL 04179616 at *19 (Eng.), https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4A7
E5AE0CF3211E99573C5E0B6E03B9F/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&conte
xtData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0.
92
Id.
93
Id. at *20.
94
Id.
95
Id.
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law, the court found that the use of AFR Locate was “sufficiently foreseeable
and accessible for the purpose of the ‘in accordance with the law’ standard.”96
The court then considered whether the use of AFR Locate passed a four-part
test that was established in a previous case.97 An interference with Article 8(1)
rights is justified if the interference passes the test set forth in Bank Mellat v. Her
Majesty’s Treasury.98 The four factors in the test are:
1. whether the objective of the measure pursued is sufficiently
important to justify the limitation of a fundamental right;
2. whether it is rationally connected to the objective;
3. whether a less intrusive measure could have been used without unacceptably compromising the objective; and
4. whether, having regard to these matters and to the severity of
the consequences, a fair balance has been struck between the
rights of the individual and the interests of the community.99
The court deemed that the first two factors were satisfied without much discussion, finding the police force “uses AFR Locate for a legitimate aim, that the
legitimate aim is sufficiently important to justify interfering with the Claimant’s
rights under Article 8” and that the police’s “use of AFR Locate is rationally
connected to the legitimate aim.”100 Thus, the Court turned to the second two
factors to determine fully whether a less intrusive measure could have been used
to accomplish the same objective and whether a fair balance was struck.101
As noted above, the court did not find for Bridges on any of his claims, and
the court therefore dismissed the case on all claims.102 The court was “satisfied
both that the current legal regime is adequate to ensure the appropriate and nonarbitrary use of AFR Locate, and that police force’s use to date of AFR Locate
has been consistent with the requirements of the Human Rights Act, and the data
protection legislation.”103

96

Id.
R. (on the application of Bridges) v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police [2019] EWHC
(QB) 2341, 2019 WL 04179616 at *22 (Eng.), https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4A7
E5AE0CF3211E99573C5E0B6E03B9F/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&conte
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Based on the “sensitive processing of personal data of members of the public”
present in the case before them, the court decided to apply a “close standard of
scrutiny” when analyzing the third and fourth factors.104 On the factor of proportionality, Bridges made five claims as to why the use was not proportionate.105
The court did not find any of Bridges’s contentions on the third factor to be convincing.106
Regarding the fourth factor of the Bank Mellat test, a fair balance between
rights of individuals with community interests, the court ruled—even under a
higher level of scrutiny—that the use of AFR Locate was not disproportionate to
their aim.107 The decision was based on the following reasons:
AFR Locate was deployed in an open and transparent way, with
significant public engagement. On each occasion, it was used for
a limited time, and covered a limited footprint. It was deployed
for the specific and limited purpose of seeking to identify particular individuals (not including the Claimant) who may have been
in the area and whose presence was of justifiable interest to the
police. On the former occasion it led to two arrests. On the latter
occasion it identified a person who had made a bomb threat at the
very same event the previous year and who had been subject to a
(suspended) custodial sentence. On neither occasion did it lead to
a disproportionate interference with anybody’s Article 8 rights.
Nobody was wrongly arrested. Nobody complained as to their
treatment (save for the Claimant on a point of principle). Any interference with the Claimant’s Article 8 rights would have been
very limited. The interference would be limited to the near instantaneous algorithmic processing and discarding of the Claimant’s
biometric data. No personal information relating to the Claimant
would have been available to any police officer, or to any human
agent. No data would be retained. There was no attempt to identify the Claimant. He was not spoken to by any police officer.108
Thus, all four factors of the Bank Mellat test were met, meaning that infringing
on Article 8(1) rights is permissible.
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Bridges appealed his case to the Court of Appeal and on August 11, 2020, the
Court of Appeal of England and Wales overturned the dismissal of the case, finding that the use of AFR was unlawful and violated human rights.109 Bridges appealed the dismissal from the High Court on the following five grounds:
1. The High Court had erred in its conclusion that South Wales
Police’s use of AFR and interference with Mr. Bridges’ rights
was in accordance with the law under Article 8(2) of the ECHR.
2. The High Court had incorrectly concluded that the use of AFR
and interference with Mr. Bridges’ rights was proportionate under Article 8(2) of the ECHR.
3. The High Court was wrong to consider the DPIA carried out in
relation to the processing sufficient for the purposes of Section
64 of the DPA 2018.
4. The High Court should not have declined to reach a conclusion
as to whether South Wales Police had an “appropriate policy document” in place regarding the use of AFR Locate that was within
the meaning of Section 42 of the DPA 2018 for carrying out sensitive data processing.
5. The High Court was wrong to hold that South Wales Police
had complied with the Public Sector Equality Duty (“PSED”) under Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, on the grounds that the
Equality Impact Assessment carried out was ‘obviously inadequate’ and failed to recognize the risk of indirect discrimination
on the basis of sex or race.110
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal granted the appeal on the basis of the contentions in 1, 3, and 5, but rejected the contentions in 2 and 4.111 While the Court of
Appeal ruled differently than the High Court, they did not admonish the lower
court for its decision, but rather acknowledged its “admirably clear and comprehensive judgments,” and that it would be “impossible in following brief summary
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to do justice to the judgment.”112 The reasoning of the Court of Appeal will now
be briefly discussed.
On ground 1, the Court of Appeal did not “accept the submission on behalf of
SWP that the present context is analogous to the taking of photographs or the use
of CCTV cameras. The following features of the present case lead us to conclude
that it falls somewhere in between the two poles on a spectrum . . . .”113 The court
noted that AFR was not analogous to previous technology use by the police for
several reasons.114 The reasons were that AFR is a novel technology, it involved
the capturing of images of a large member of the public, most of which would
be no interest to the police, this data constituted “sensitive” personal data within
the DPA 2018, and that the data was processed in an automated manner.115
Within the legal framework, the court found “fundamental deficiencies” in two
areas for the use of AFR. The fundamental deficiencies were the “who question”
and the “where question,” finding that “[i]n relation to both of those questions
too much discretion is currently left to individual police officers. It is not clear
who can be placed on the watchlist nor is it clear that there are any criteria for
determining where AFR can be deployed.”116 Ultimately, the Court stated, “that
the current policies do not sufficiently set out the terms on which discretionary
powers can be exercised by the police and for that reason do not have the necessary quality of law.”117
On ground 2, the issue of proportionality of the use of AFR to harm the police
were trying to mitigate, the Court noted that it was technically unnecessary for
them to consider the issue because once it was determined that “the interference
with the Appellant’s Article 8 rights was not in accordance with the law,” that
one does not need to proceed to the next stage where it is determined if the interference was proportionate.118
Grounds 3 and 4 of Bridges’s appeal related to section 64 of the DPA 2018 so
it will not be discussed due to its lack of relevancy to the European Convention
on Human Rights. While Ground 5 dealt with the Public Sector Equality Duty,
so there will be no discussion of this section for the same reason.
The Court granted the appeal on Grounds 1, 3, and 5, and found declaratory
relief to be the correct remedy.119 The declaration of the Court is as follows:
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1. The Respondent’s use of Live Automated Facial Recognition
technology on 21 December 2017 and 27 March 2018 and on an
ongoing basis, which engaged Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, was not in accordance with the law for
the purposes of Article 8(2).
2. As a consequence of the declaration set out in paragraph 1
above, in respect of the Respondent’s ongoing use of Live Automated Facial Recognition technology, its Data Protection Impact
Assessment did not comply with section 64(3)(b) and (c) of the
Data Protection Act of 2018.
3. The respondent did not comply with the Public Sector Equality
Duty in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 prior to or in the
course of its use of Live Automated Facial Recognition technology on 21 December 2017 and 27 March 2018 and on an ongoing
basis.120
If Bridges’s case had been denied an appeal, his case had been dismissed, or
is appealed and loses on the merits before the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, then Bridges could appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.121 After
the final decision from the Welsh courts, Bridges must submit an application to
the European Court of Human Rights within six months.122 The application to
must relate to one of the rights within the European Convention on Human
Rights.123 Therefore, Bridges could appeal his challenge on the grounds that the
use of AFR Locate violated his Article 8 rights, but not on his claims under
Welsh law.
Once the European Court of Human Rights receives an application, it determines the admissibility of the application. To be admissible, the application
“must comply with certain requirements set out in the Convention.”124 If the
court finds the application inadmissible, then the decision is final and cannot be
overturned.125 If the court finds the application admissible, then the court encourages the parties to reach a settlement.126 However, if the parties refuse to settle,
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then the court will hear the case and decide whether a violation of the European
Convention on Human Rights transpired.127
The current backlog of cases in the court means it could take up to a year
before the court hears a case.128 Almost all European Court of Human Rights
proceedings take place in writing, and parties are informed of the final decision
in writing.129 If the court finds a violation under the Convention, it awards “a
sum of money in compensation for certain forms of damage.”130 The court cannot
“overrule national decisions or annul national laws.”131 So, in the event that
Bridges appeals his case and wins at the European Court of Human Rights, he
would gain financial compensation; however, he would not receive any guarantee the Welsh government will stop using the technology.
The European Court of Human Rights has evaluated hundreds, if not thousands, of claims under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.132 The court published a guide for Article 8 claims in 2016, citing more
than 700 cases.133 While the court has yet to consider a case on facial recognition
technology of this sort, it has issued opinions involving personal images, video
surveillance, and personal data privacy.134 Several cases the Court has disposed
of contain claims with similar elements to those in Bridges, which demonstrates
how the court may frame and ultimately rule on this issue.
In several cases, the court held “that the recording of a video in the law enforcement context or the release of the applicants’ photographs by police authorities to the media constituted an interference with their right to respect for private
life.”135 However, the court has also found “the taking and retention of a photograph of a suspected terrorist without her consent was not disproportionate to the
legitimate terrorist-prevention aims of a democratic society.”136 Bridges’s claim
of privacy violation seems to arise in a situation much more similar to the latter
case, as Bridges’s photo was not distributed to anyone nor was he identified
based on that video surveillance as a criminal by the police department or the
media.
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In another case, the court held that rights under Article 8 would be “unacceptably weakened” if modern scientific techniques used by the criminal justice system “were allowed at any cost and without carefully balancing the potential benefits of the extensive use of such techniques against important private-life
interests.”137 While that holding came out of S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, which involved fingerprint and DNA data,138 the court could easily apply
such principles to Bridges, as his claim derives from utilizing new technology in
the criminal justice system and involves personal data. Nevertheless, as discussed above, the High Court of Wales went into a rather thorough balancing
analysis between citizens’ Article 8 rights and the government’s interests.139
Thus, the High Court of Wales will likely carefully balance such interests, as the
European Court of Human Rights calls for, given a similar situation.
Peck v. the United Kingdom is another useful case in framing Bridges’ Article
8 claim.140 In this case, video surveillance identifying a man attempting suicide
in a public place was distributed to media for broadcast.141 Despite the fact that
the surveillance of this man was in a public place, the Court held that the government’s actions here violated his privacy rights.142 While this case has some
similarities to Bridges in that both involved video surveillance of citizens in a
public place, the major distinction between the two is the dissemination of that
footage to the media in Peck. Thus, based on the major factual difference in dissemination, the Court may see the government’s actions regarding Bridges as
less of an invasion of privacy.

IV. CONCLUSION

As technological advances proliferate, the legal framework surrounding and
governing the use of technology is also expanding. As personal information becomes increasingly accessible, a pertinent question emerges: Where will the legal community draw the line concerning privacy rights? Facial Recognition
Technology is rapidly developing, as well as its application by government services on their citizens. Countries and cities around the world are starting to wrestle with the tension between public safety and personal privacy regarding law
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enforcement agencies employing FRT as a tool to monitor citizens in public
spaces.
Bridges highlights this delicate balancing act that courts and legislatures will
face when considering this topic. Bridges believed his face had been scanned by
Welsh police during peaceful protests and challenged the usage of FRT by claiming that it violated his privacy rights. The High Court of Wales and the Court of
Appeal of England and Wales provided detailed analyses of all of Bridges’
claims, including his Article 8 claim. Comparing the factual events in Bridges to
other Article 8 claims the European Court of Human Rights has ruled on, it appears that as the Welsh program currently stands, the Court would probably not
find a violation of Bridges’ Article 8 rights. Based on the lack of public distribution, storage, and limited target lists, the Welsh AFR Locate program does not
seem invasive enough to constitute a violation of Bridges’ Article 8 rights. At
this time, if Bridges were to exhaust all his remedies at the national level, it is
unlikely that the European Court of Human Rights would hold the use of AFR
Locate violated his Article 8 rights.
While FRT used in the manner the South Wales Police Department used it in
AFR Locate does not appear to violate Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, other governments’ use of FRT very well may be more invasive
and violate other international laws or norms. As governments continue to utilize
facial recognition technology in various ways, it is highly likely that many new
legal questions will present themselves.

